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Trichinellosis is a rare parasitic zoonosis caused by 
Trichinella following ingestion of raw or undercooked 
meat containing Trichinella larvae. In the past five 
years, there has been a sharp decrease in human trich-
inellosis incidence rates in the European Union due 
to better practices in rearing domestic animals and 
control measures in slaughterhouses. In November 
2014, a large outbreak of trichinellosis occurred in 
Belgium, related to the consumption of imported wild 
boar meat. After a swift local public health response, 
16 cases were identified and diagnosed with trichinel-
losis. Of the 16 cases, six were female. The diagnosis 
was confirmed by serology or the presence of larvae in 
the patients’ muscle biopsies by histology and/or PCR. 
The ensuing investigation traced the wild boar meat 
back to Spain. Several batches of imported wild boar 
meat were recalled but tested negative. The public 
health investigation allowed us to identify clustered 
undiagnosed cases. Early warning alerts and a coor-
dinated response remain indispensable at a European 
level.
Introduction
Trichinellosis is a parasitic zoonosis caused by nema-
todes of the genus Trichinella. The parasite infects 
domestic and wild animals and has a worldwide dis-
tribution [1]. The life cycle of the parasite consists of 
a domestic cycle in mainly pigs and a sylvatic cycle in 
a wider range of animals such as bears and wild boar 
[2-5]. Humans become infected after eating raw or 
undercooked meat from domestic pigs, horses or game 
containing Trichinella larvae [6-10]. The most important 
prevention measure is to freeze the meat or when pre-
paring it, to ensure the core of the meat is cooked at a 
minimum of 67 °C, measured with a food thermometer, 
in order to kill the larvae. Different minimum temper-
atures and necessary duration of cooking are recom-
mended according to the meat source [11].
Trichinella has unusual features, in comparison with 
other helminths. After ingestion, infective larvae are 
released from the muscular fibre and invade the epi-
thelium of the host’s small intestine. Sexually mature 
adult worms produce larvae in the small intestine, 
which subsequently disseminate in the host and 
invade muscle tissue [12,13]. Once the parasite com-
pletes development in the muscle, it remains infective 
for months or years. The pathological mechanisms of 
disease are complex and are partly related to direct 
lesions caused by invasion of the parasite into the 
host’s muscle. A large inflammatory reaction mediated 
by eosinophils triggers numerous clinical manifesta-
tions during the acute stage of the disease [14].
The clinical picture is usually described by two stages: 
an intestinal stage within the first or second week 
after infection resulting in nausea or diarrhoea and a 
later muscular stage with periorbital oedema, myalgia 
or muscle weakness as the major symptoms [3]. The 
disease is mostly self-limiting: the adult worms live a 
mean of two to three weeks and the muscular phase 
is the end-stage of the infection [3]. However, major 
complications may arise during invasion of the mus-
cle, including myocarditis, encephalitis and pulmonary 
superinfection. Fatalities have been described in infec-
tions with a high inoculum [15]. Cardiac involvement is 
the most frequent cause of death in human trichinel-
losis [16-18]. Although muscular symptoms usually 
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subside within two to four weeks, even in mild infec-
tions, muscular fatigue may last up to six months. 
Treatment consists of administration of antiparasitic 
agents with or without systemic glucocorticoid treat-
ment [3,9].
In Europe, four species of Trichinella (T. spiralis, T. 
nativa, T. britovi and T. pseudospiralis) are endemic 
in domestic and wild animals [19]. Since 1992, the 
European Union (EU) Council Directive 92/45 has 
required the examination of meat of wild boars (Sus 
scrofa), domestic pigs and horses for the presence of 
Trichinella species before processing and marketing 
[20,21]. Before implementation of the EU directives, 
high incidence rates of human trichinellosis were 
observed in eastern European countries (2.46–5.45 
cases/100,000 persons/year), but they have decreased 
sharply in the past five years [22]. According to the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC), 320 confirmed human cases were reported in 
the EU during 2014 [23]. In Belgium, the last reported 
cases in humans after eating indigenous wild boar 
meat occurred in 1979 [24]. In Belgium, Trichinella 
infection has not been detected in domestic pigs or 
horses since 1992, although serological evidence has 
pointed towards the presence of Trichinella species in 
wild boar and foxes [25,26].
The event
At the end of November 2014, 10 patients were admit-
ted to three different hospitals in Belgium with fever, 
periorbital swelling, muscular pain and remarkable 
eosinophilia after eating wild boar meat in three dif-
ferent restaurants. A diagnosis of trichinellosis was 
confirmed by serology and PCR on the patients’ muscle 
biopsies, in which T. spiralis was identified. In order 
to determine the extent of the outbreak, to identify its 
source and to implement control measures, an epide-
miological study was conducted. 
In Flanders, the northern region of Belgium, food-
borne illnesses are notified to the Flemish Agency for 
Care and Health, which is responsible for investigating 
the source of disease and limiting its further spread. 
This is done in collaboration with the Federal Agency 
for the Safety of the Food Chain (FASFC), which oper-
ates nationwide to monitor and protect food safety. 
On 3 December, after the first diagnoses of human 
trichinellosis that day, both agencies were notified by 
email and other informal channels. Alerts were sent 
out regionally and all relevant public health authori-
ties were informed. Through a ProMED Mail posting 
[27], this warning was communicated to the broader 
infectious disease community. The European Early 
warning and Response System (EWRS) and the Rapid 
Alert Safety for Food and Feed (RASFF) were alerted, 
to inform public health authorities in all EU Member 
States. Radio and television broadcasts and newspa-
pers reported on the disease outbreak. Primary care 
physicians in the affected regions were asked to stay 
alert for patients with symptoms possibly related to 
trichinellosis and to ask symptomatic patients for 
details of potential exposure. Suspected cases had to 
be reported to the Flemish Agency for Care and Health.
Methods
Outbreak case definition
A probable case of trichinellosis was defined as a 
person who had consumed wild boar meat between 1 
November and 6 December 2014 (two days after the 
first diagnosis and the start date of the outbreak inves-
tigation), with eosinophilia of > 500 cells/µL (norm: 
0–450 cells/µL) with symptoms of myositis with or 
without fever (body temperature > 38 °C). Myositis was 
defined as muscle pain or muscle tenderness on physi-
cal examination and/or creatinine kinase levels > 200 
international units (IU)/L (norm: 0–171 IU/L). 
A confirmed case was defined as a probable case with 
positive serology or seroconversion, detected by anti-
Trichinella IgG, or the presence of intramuscular larvae 
in a muscle biopsy as demonstrated by histology and 
PCR.
Laboratory analysis
The choice of diagnostic workup was at the discretion of 
the treating clinician and usually included blood counts, 
serum biochemical testing, electrocardiography, echo-
cardiography, imaging studies and electromyography. 
Serological testing was performed at the National 
Reference Laboratory for Infectious and Tropical dis-
eases at the Antwerp Institute of Tropical Medicine 
(ITM) using a commercially available assay based on 
excretory/secretory Trichinella antigens (Trichinella 
Microwell Serum ELISA, SciMedx Corporation, Denville, 
NJ, United States). ELISA-positive sera were confirmed 
by an in-house ELISA and western blot. Muscle biopsies 
Figure 1
Epidemic curve of a trichinellosis outbreak, Belgium, 
November–December 2014 (n = 16)
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The number of new cases is displayed according to the date of 
symptom onset, per time frame of four days, according to the type 
of exposure. Severe exposure was defined as having eaten a full 
dish of slowly roasted wild boar fillet; mild exposure was defined 
as having eaten small portions of slowly roasted wild boar fillet or 
wild boar stew
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were examined by the local pathologist. For this pur-
pose, 3 μm sections were cut from formalin-fixed, par-
affin-embedded muscle biopsy specimens and stained 
with haematoxylin and eosin. Portions of the biopsies 
were also sent to the National Reference Laboratory for 
Trichinella at ITM, for additional examination including 
trichinoscopy and magnetic stirrer artificial digestion 
[28]. After HCl-pepsin digestion, isolated larvae were 
characterised by multiplex PCR following DNA extrac-
tion from single larvae [29,30].
Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis of the data was performed with 
SPSS 19. After normality testing using the Shapiro–
Wilk test and assessment of the equality of variances 
with the Levene test, Student’s t-test was used to 
determine differences in continuous variables between 
subgroups. The differences between other epidemio-
logical parameters were evaluated with Fisher’s exact 
test. An α-error of p < 0.05 was considered statistically 
significant.
Trace-back investigation
The FASFC and the Flemish Agency for Care and Health 
conducted a trace-back investigation focusing on the 
supply chain of the suspected meat. A detailed ques-
tionnaire about time of consumption of wild boar meat, 
time and duration of symptoms and treatment modali-
ties was sent to all confirmed cases. Clinical and 
laboratory data from the individual patient files were 
reviewed after obtaining informed consent. Serological 
testing for trichinellosis was performed for asympto-
matic persons accompanying confirmed cases at the 
restaurants and reporting the same consumption.
Results
Epidemiological characteristics of the cases
During the last 2 weeks of November 2014 and the first 
2 weeks of December 2014, 16 patients were identified 
as confirmed cases of trichinellosis. They all reported 
eating wild boar meat during the first week of November 
in three restaurants in the Belgian provinces of Limburg 
and Antwerp. The exact date of meat consumption was 
Figure 2
Timeline showing exposure, incubation period and diagnostic examinations, trichinellosis outbreak, Belgium, 1 


















1 Nov 5 Nov 10 Nov 15 Nov 20 Nov
Date in 2014
25 Nov 30 Nov 5 Dec
Incubation Clinical symptoms Hospitalisation Negative serologyMuscle biopsy Positive serology
Severe exposure Mild exposure
Cases 1–6 had mild exposure (defined as having eaten small portions of slowly roasted wild boar fillet or wild boar stew); Cases 7–16 had 
severe exposure (defined as having eaten a full dish of slowly roasted wild boar fillet).
Serological tests were performed after the initial diagnosis was made by muscle biopsy, in some cases retrospectively. Some cases were 
diagnosed or remained hospitalised after 5 December (shown as horizontal dotted lines). 
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known for all the cases. Their median age was 37 years 
(interquartile range (IQR): 31–48; standard deviation 
(SD): 11); six were female (Table). Two subgroups were 
distinguished according to the type of exposure: cases 
who had eaten a full dish of slowly roasted wild boar 
fillet (classed as ‘severe’ exposure, n = 10) and those 
who had eaten small portions of slowly roasted wild 
boar fillet or wild boar stew (classed as ‘mild’ expo-
sure, n = 6). 
None of the cases reported eating other game meat 
during the investigation period. The epidemic curve of 
the outbreak is shown in Figure 1 and a timeline with 
data on exposure, incubation period, and clinical and 
laboratory data are presented in Figure 2.
Clinical and laboratory data
The cases’ first symptoms appeared after a mean period 
of 15 days (range: 6–24; SD: 7) post-exposure. Cases 
with severe exposure had a significantly shorter incu-
bation period compared with those with mild exposure: 
mean 10 days (range: 6–21; SD: 5) vs 22 days (range: 
19–24; SD: 2), p < 0.000 (Table). The most frequent 
symptoms are summarised in the Table. Periorbital 
oedema lasted on average six days (range: 2–13 days; 
SD: 3). Muscular pain or tenderness was reported, 
ranging from moderate to severe and involved both 
upper and lower extremities (8/16) or was limited to 
the lower limbs (6/16). Symptoms related to the intes-
tinal stage were reported by five cases. A total of 10 
cases were hospitalised for a mean period of 14 days 
(range: 2–75; SD: 21); three required admission to an 
intensive-care unit.
Six cases initially presented with neurological com-
plaints, including photophobia, neck stiffness and 
headache. Brain computed tomography (CT) of all 
cases showed no abnormalities. Three underwent lum-
bar puncture: their cerebrospinal fluid showed no cellu-
lar or biochemical abnormalities and bacterial cultures 
remained negative. One of the three who underwent 
lumbar puncture developed generalised muscle weak-
ness 10 days after exposure, which remained severely 
debilitating two months later despite treatment with 
albendazole and corticosteroids. This case, a man in 
his early 50s, had, however, underlying conditions, 
which could obscure the clinical picture. A full-body 
positron emission tomography/CT and electromyogra-
phy analysis were consistent with diffuse myositis [31]. 
The persisting symptoms included tremor, impaired 
coordination, fine motor control and loss of strength in 
the main muscle groups. 
Laboratory analysis of all cases showed marked eosin-
ophilia, reaching a peak on four weeks after exposure, 
with a mean of 34% (range: 7–65%; SD: 13) white blood 
cells (norm: 1–6%). Serum creatinine kinase (CK) lev-
els were elevated in all but two cases (mean: 666 units 
(U)/L (range: 101–1,564; SD: 450; norm: < 171 U/L), with 
a peak concentration coinciding with maximum eosino-
philia levels.
In four of five cases tested for troponin T, elevated lev-
els pointed to myocarditis. Electrocardiogram analysis 
pointed towards myocarditis in four cases. One such 
case had signs of anteroseptal myocardial oedema 
without a dynamic gradient on transthoracic ultra-
sound evaluation, which had normalised at a second 
examination three weeks later. Serial follow-up of tro-
ponin levels in three cases showed a prolonged eleva-
tion compared with CK levels.
All cases received anthelmintic treatment, consisting 
of oral mebendazole 300–500 mg every eight hours 
(n = 14) or albendazole 400mg every 12 hours (n = 2) for 
14 days. The hospitalised cases (n = 10) received meth-
ylprednisolone for a minimum of two days. There was a 
mean of 32 days (range: 26–39; SD: 4) between expo-
sure and treatment start. Clinical improvement was 
observed after 48–72 hours after treatment. All but the 
above-mentioned case had an uneventful recovery.
Serology and microbiological identification
The clinical suspicion of Trichinella infection was con-
firmed by serology in all 16 cases. Biopsies of quadri-
ceps muscle from three cases, weighing 0.24 g, 0.26 g 
and 0.30 g, revealed lymphohistiocytosis, eosinophilic 
infiltration and first-stage Trichinella larvae, which 
were identified as T. spiralis by multiplex PCR. One 
additional biopsy revealed eosinophilic myositis with-
out detection of larvae. 
Three persons who ate slowly roasted wild boar fillet 
or wild boar stew at the same time in the same res-
taurants as eight of the cases stayed healthy without 
developing any symptoms. Paired samples tested sero-
logically at five and nine weeks after consumption of 
the dish remained negative.
Source tracing
The FASFC conducted an investigation, focusing on five 
suppliers of wild boar meat, in collaboration with the 
three restaurants involved. On inspection, there was 
evidence that the cold chain had been respected in all 
three restaurants. The investigation identified a single 
distributor of wild boar meat, imported from a certified 
supplier in north-eastern Spain. As there was a delay 
of several weeks between eating the suspected meat 
and the start of the investigation, no Spanish wild boar 
meat from this distributor remained in the restaurants 
where the cases had eaten. A week before the cases 
had eaten the suspected meat, all three restaurants 
received supplies of wild boar meat of the same batch 
on the same day. One supplier still had meat from the 
same batch. The remaining meat from this batch, as 
well as other batches from the same Spanish exporter, 
were recalled. A total of 58 samples from 21 different 
batches were examined by magnetic stirrer artificial 
digestion at the ITM, using 100 g per sample in 1g 
portions. None of these samples contained Trichinella 
larvae.
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As a precaution, the FASFC decided that all sampled 
batches of Spanish wild boar meat had to undergo 
heat treatment at 84 °C for 640 min, using a protocol 
adapted to the final product and application of the 
meat. Remaining meat from the suspected batch was 
destroyed.
Discussion
Despite the EU directive, which requires wild boars 
hunted for commercial purpose to be examined for 
Trichinella larvae, an infection risk for humans remains 
due to important reservoirs (wild carnivore mammals) 
[1,20,22]. The source of infection of this outbreak 
pointed towards wild boar meat imported from Spain, 
where Trichinella sp. infection is still endemic in the 
wild boar population [32,33]. According to ECDC epi-
demiological data, trichinellosis was most prevalent 
in eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and 
Latvia) mainly due to eating domestic pork. In mediter-
ranean Europe, Italy and Spain reported respectively 33 
and 10 cases in 2012 [22]. Several outbreaks in these 
two southern European countries have been reported 
in the past 10 years [34-36].
No Trichinella-positive samples were found in the 
remaining imported wild boar meat. No remaining sup-
plies of the suspected batch could be retrieved from 
the restaurants involved, due to the timeframe of the 
recall operation. The clinical pattern of the disease in 
humans often leads to a diagnosis several weeks after 
infection, which hampers source-tracing efforts. The 
authorities and controlling agencies in Spain reported 
no irregularities in the suspected slaughterhouse. No 
other Trichinella outbreaks were reported in the EU 
during the same time period. However, this cluster of 
infections highlights the importance of European-wide 
monitoring and an early warning system. Swift action 
by local networks and agencies is critical when a 
food-borne outbreak is detected. In this outbreak, the 
EWRS and RASFF made it possible to communicate effi-
ciently and inform other potentially affected regions. 
Currently, the large EU-funded research Platform 
for European Preparedness Against (Re-) emerg-
ing Epidemics (PREPARE) is aiming to harmonise the 
response to severe infectious disease outbreaks and 
assemble real-time evidence for clinical management 
of patients. It should be noted, however, that due to the 
long incubation period and the delay of seroconversion 
Table
Characteristics of trichinellosis cases according to level of exposurea, Belgium, November–December 2014 (n = 16)
Characteristics
Number of casesb 
among all cases 
n = 16
Number of casesb among those 
with severe exposurea 
n = 10
Number of casesb among 
those with mild exposurea 
n = 6
P valuec
Median age in years (IQR) 37 (31–48) 47 (34–50) 30 (20–39) 0.02
Female 6 3 3 0.61
Median time to symptom onset after eating 
wild boar meat, in days (IQR) 13 (8–22) 9 (8–13) 22 (21–23) < 0.00
Intestinal-stage gastrointestinal symptoms 6 4 2 1.00
Symptoms reported at presentation 
Fatigue 16 10 6 1.00
Fever 14 9 5 1.00
Night sweats 14 10 4 0.12
Periorbital oedema 14 9 5 1.00
Ophtalmological inflammation 14 9 5 1.00
Photophobia 6 4 2 1.00
Headache 12 7 5 1.00
Muscular pain 14 9 5 1.00
Abdominal pain 5 3 2 1.00
Rash 1 1 0 1.00
Lymphadenopathy 1 1 0 1.00
Outcome 
Hospitalisation 10 7 3 0.65
Myocarditis 4 4 0 0.23
Complete recovery 15 9 6 1.00
IQR: interquartile range.
a Severe exposure was defined as having eaten a full dish of slowly roasted wild boar fillet. Mild exposure was defined as having eaten small 
portions of slowly roasted wild boar fillet or wild boar stew. 
b Unless otherwise specified.
c Severe exposure vs mild exposure.
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in parasitic food-borne infections [3], mounting a rapid 
response to an outbreak is often difficult.
Although Trichinella larvae can be destroyed by heat-
ing [3], the preparation of boar meat remains problem-
atic given the culinary habit of serving and eating meat 
that is not always fully cooked. In this outbreak, the 
cases who consumed a full dish of slowly roasted wild 
boar fillet seemed to have been exposed to a higher 
degree than those who ate wild boar stew, prepared at 
higher temperatures and for a longer duration. The rec-
ommendations of the United States Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) regarding prevention of 
trichinellosis stress the use of a food thermometer to 
evaluate the internal meat temperature [11].
It has been suggested that the severity of the clinical 
features of trichinellosis is proportional to the num-
ber of larvae ingested [14]. In this outbreak, cases 
with severe exposure developed symptoms signifi-
cantly earlier and showed a trend towards more severe 
clinical presentation, with more gastrointestinal com-
plaints and cardiological complications compared with 
cases with mild exposure.
The overall clinical picture was consistent with the 
typical pattern as reported in literature: signs and 
symptoms appeared one to four weeks after exposure 
and included almost always the classical triad of fever, 
periorbital oedema and muscular pain or tenderness 
[14]. Four of the 16 patients had symptoms of myocar-
ditis, consistent with earlier studies investigating car-
diac involvement in human trichinellosis [16-18]. There 
was evidence of ECG changes in 56% of cases in 154 
cases in one study [37]. Trichinella larvae do not encyst 
in heart muscle cells: myocarditis is a consequence 
of the transient passage of larvae and the resulting 
eosinophilic infiltration in myocardial cells. In some of 
our cases, elevated troponin levels persisted after nor-
malisation of CK, indicating a possible underestima-
tion of myocarditis severity when only CK is measured. 
Our observation suggests that troponin measurement 
might be relevant as part of the initial assessment and 
follow-up of trichinellosis, together with conventional 
electrographic and ultrasound cardiac monitoring.
None of the cases had encephalitis, but some had 
symptoms suggestive of meningismus (photophobia, 
neck stiffness), although this was not confirmed as 
meningitis. In hindsight, the symptoms of photopho-
bia, eye inflammation or visual disturbances could be 
related to ocular muscle involvement and larval inva-
sion rather than neurological pathology.
Most patients (15/16) recovered rapidly after adminis-
tration of antihelminthic treatment and/or corticoids. 
However, only a few randomised controlled trials and 
observational studies are available to guide treatment 
modalities. Several questions remain regarding the 
need for and choice or dosage of antihelminthics more 
than 4–6 weeks after exposure [3,38-40]. In contrast, 
early administration of antiparasitic treatment seems 
crucial to prevent or reduce trichinellosis symptoms. 
Recent evidence suggests that post-exposure prophy-
laxis within one week after infection should be strongly 
encouraged because the development of symptoms 
might be completely prevented [41].
Our report also shows the importance of obtaining a 
detailed food consumption history as quickly as pos-
sible when a cluster of infections with a similar clinical 
pattern is observed. With the combination of coor-
dinated actions and communication, we identified a 
total of 16 cases, including seven who did not seek 
medical attention immediately. It is possible that addi-
tional cases with milder or no symptoms were missed. 
Although no active outreach to all potentially exposed 
persons was undertaken, we are confident that the 
large media coverage and intensive communication 
allowed the passive detection of most symptomatic 
patients. The requests for serological tests for trich-
inellosis at the ITM surged up to 10-fold in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the disease outbreak: none of those 
tests were positive.
Conclusion
Several important lessons can be learnt from this 
outbreak, the largest reported to date in Belgium. 
Although a rare disease in western Europe, Trichinella 
remains a threat to food chain safety in 2016 despite 
measures taken at a European level. In countries where 
the prevalence of Trichinella in wildlife or domestic 
pork is still high, strict application of EU regulations 
and adequate control in slaughterhouses might be 
appropriate. In case of human infections, a transna-
tional early warning system is important to alert the 
appropriate authorities, who can take swift action and 
control further spread of an outbreak.
Clinician’s awareness of the features suggestive of 
trichinellosis, particularly in clustered cases, can has-
ten early diagnosis, prevent complications and even 
lead to administration of effective post-exposure 
prophylaxis in other potentially exposed persons. The 
role of serial troponin measurements, in addition to CK 
levels, should be further explored as a marker of dis-
ease severity. 
Finally, there is a need for more research and clini-
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In Italy a national Plan for the surveillance of imported 
and autochthonous human vector-borne diseases (chi-
kungunya, dengue, Zika virus disease and West Nile 
virus (WNV) disease) that integrates human and veter-
inary (animals and vectors) surveillance, is issued and 
revised annually according with the observed epidemi-
ological changes. Here we describe results of the WNV 
integrated veterinary and human surveillance systems 
in Italy from 2008 to 2015. A real time data exchange 
protocol is in place between the surveillance systems 
to rapidly identify occurrence of human and animal 
cases and to define and update the map of affected 
areas i.e. provinces during the vector activity period 
from June to October. WNV continues to cause severe 
illnesses in Italy during every transmission season, 
albeit cases are sporadic and the epidemiology var-
ies by virus lineage and geographic area. The integra-
tion of surveillance activities and a multidisciplinary 
approach made it possible and have been fundamental 
in supporting implementation of and/or strengthen-
ing preventive measures aimed at reducing the risk of 
transmission of WNV trough blood, tissues and organ 
donation and to implementing further measures for 
vector control.
Introduction
West Nile virus (WNV), a single stranded RNA virus of 
the genus Flavivirus, is mostly transmitted by mos-
quito bites, but also through organ transplantation, 
blood transfusion, in the laboratory setting and from 
mother to child during pregnancy, delivery, or breast-
feeding [1]. The virus is maintained in a continuous 
vertebrate-mosquito cycle. Mosquitoes are the vectors 
and birds are the reservoir for West Nile virus. Humans, 
horses and other mammals are considered dead-end 
hosts and do not contribute to further spread of the 
disease.
In humans, ca 80% of infections are asymptomatic, 
20% of those infected may present with fever and or 
influenza-like symptoms, whereas less than 1% i.e. 
mostly the elderly and immunocompromised people, 
develop West Nile neuroinvasive diseases (WNND) 
such as encephalitis, meningo-encephalitis or menin-
gitis that may lead to death [1,2].
In 1996, the first large human outbreak of WND in 
Europe was reported in Romania with 393 confirmed 
cases [3] and since then, the number of WNND cases 
reported in humans increased significantly. From 2002 
to 2009, several WNV outbreaks were reported in a 
few European and neighbouring countries (Albania, 
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Kosovo, Montenegro, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine) [4]. After 2005, an 
endemic transmission cycle started in some south-
eastern and eastern European countries with annual 
outbreaks [5-8], mostly sustained by the rapid spread 
of WNV lineage 2 strains belonging to the Hungarian 
and Volgograd clade [9].
In Italy, the first outbreak of WNV infection was 
reported in 1998 in the region of Tuscany [10] and since 
2001, a national veterinary surveillance plan for WNV 
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based on wild bird mortality and on entomological and 
sentinel animal surveillance has been in place. The 
plan aims at monitoring areas at risk for WNV circula-
tion, and detecting WNV seroconversion in horses in 
these areas [10,11]. In parallel, in 2002, human surveil-
lance recommendations were issued by the Ministry 
of Health requesting all 21 Italian regions and autono-
mous provinces and autonomous provinces to report 
to the national mandatory surveillance system all hos-
pitalised cases of aseptic meningitis and encephalitis 
with unknown aetiology, and cases of fever with rash 
in the areas where veterinary cases where identified. 
Moreover, health authorities were requested to actively 
identify cases and possible WNV seroconversion in 
close contacts of infected animals such as employees 
of stables and veterinarians or people living in the area 
[12].
The veterinary and human surveillance systems did not 
detect any relevant circulation of WNV until 2008, when 
the virus was identified in mosquitoes, birds, horses 
and humans in the area surrounding the Po river delta, 
involving three north Italian regions [2].
Since the re-introduction of the virus in 2008, a con-
stant and intensified WNV circulation across the whole 
of Italy was observed with a geographical spread of 
WNV to the west and south [2,13]. Moreover, from 2008 
to 2011, WNV lineage 1 was responsible for reported 
human WNDD cases, but, since 2011, evidence of exten-
sive circulation of lineage 2 closely related to both the 
Hungarian and Volgograd clades, was demonstrated 
[13-15]. This suggests a possible introduction of line-
age 2 from central and/or eastern European countries, 
probably through migratory birds [16,17].
WNV has caused severe illnesses in humans in Italy 
every season over nearly a decade. However, cases 
occur sporadically and the epidemiology varies accord-
ing to the virus lineage and the affected geographic 
area. Integrated surveillance is essential to identify 
outbreaks in a timely fashion and to guide prevention 
efforts aimed at reducing the incidence of severe cases 
and at reducing the probability of virus transmission 
via blood, tissue and organ donations.




2014 and 2015 seasons
2015 season
Figure 1
Geographical distribution of West Nile neuroinvasive disease in horses (panel A) and humans (panel B), Italy 2008–2015 
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Here we present the evolution of the national surveil-
lance plan in the five years following its first imple-
mentation, and briefly describe results of the WNV 
integrated surveillance system in Italy.
Methods
The integrated veterinary and human 
surveillance systems in Italy
In 2008 and 2011, the national WNV veterinary sur-
veillance plan [18] and the WNND human surveillance 
recommendations [19] were revised, respectively. New 
activities were added including the potential integra-
tion between veterinary (animals and vectors) and 
human surveillance. Provinces with evidence of animal 
and vector or human infections in the previous season 
have to implement active surveillance and manda-
tory screening of blood donations. The veterinary and 
human plans have been published separately and they 
were revised annually according to the epidemiological 
situation in the country. Since 2009, some north Italian 
regions have implemented an integrated surveillance, 
targeting mosquitoes, birds, and humans [15].
Pillars of the national integrated surveillance system 
are (i) the entomological monitoring based on mosquito 
collections in selected sites; (ii) the animal surveil-
lance targeting migratory and resident birds as well as 
horses and poultry; (iii) the human surveillance system 
requesting clinicians to report all possible, probable 
and confirmed WNV cases, irrespective of age, using a 
modified European case definition which includes neu-
rological symptoms in the clinical criteria [2].
For veterinary surveillance purposes, the Italian ter-
ritory was subdivided in two distinct epidemiologi-
cal territories: endemic and non-endemic. The former 
includes the territories where WNV was detected in 
the previous two years. At present these are the plain 
of the Po river valley, including Friuli Venezia Giulia, 
Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Piedmont, Veneto regions, 
and the two main Italian islands: Sardinia and Sicily. 
The remainder of Italy is considered non-endemic. In 
the endemic territories, an early warning system is in 
place, which enables the reinforcement of the activi-
ties aiming at detecting WNV in vectors and birds [20]. 
In particular, the regions of the plain of the Po river 
i.e. Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, 
Piedmont, Veneto, operate an enhanced surveillance 
system based on a network of fixed mosquito traps 
(in grids from 10 to 20 km) and on the collection of 
residential wild birds, mainly Corvidae. Timely data on 
viral circulation triggers preventive measures to avoid 
the virus transmission via blood, tissue and organ 
donations [15,21,22].
Figure 2
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Data collected through the Veterinary Plan are reg-
istered using an information system (SISMAN) that 
records and manages laboratory results and publishes 
weekly and daily reports describing the outcomes of 
the surveillance activities. A web-based geographic 
information system (WebGIS) was developed for dis-
playing thematic maps and to help the veterinary ser-
vices to explore the area surrounding the outbreak, 
and to create buffers around the reported cases.
Human cases are notified by regional and local 
authorities to the Ministry of Health and to the Istituto 
Superiore di Sanità (ISS, national public health insti-
tute) using a specific password-protected web-based 
system, which permits to report probable and con-
firmed cases, adding available epidemiological (includ-
ing the province of exposure), clinical and laboratory 
information. The web-based system is accessible also 
to the National Blood Center (NBC) and to the National 
Transplant Center (NTC), which implement precaution-
ary measures on blood donation and transplant activi-
ties also on the basis of data on WNV human cases.
In order to rapidly identify, define and update the map 
of the affected areas i.e. provinces during the vector 
activity period, a real-time data exchange protocol is in 
place between the two systems.
Definitions and identification of at risk areas 
in Italy
The national plan for human surveillance defines as 
‘affected areas’ all the provinces (Nomenclature of 
Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS)-3) [23] where lab-
oratory-confirmed WNV infections in animals, vectors 
or humans, irrespective of age, were notified in the 
previous years or during the surveillance period. The 
‘surveillance period’ covers the months between the 
1 June and 30 October, which is considered the period 
with the highest vector activity. Identification of an 
affected area immediately triggers the definition of the 
‘surveillance area’ for the whole region (NUTS-2 level) 
where the affected area is located. In the surveillance 
area, passive human surveillance has to be set up, and 
physicians are requested to report all possible, prob-
able and confirmed WNND cases. In the affected areas, 
the NBC and the NTC immediately activate the WNV 
screening, by Nucleic Acid Amplification Test (NAT), of 
all blood, blood component, and organ donations until 
the end of the vector season in order to avoid WNV 
transmission [24].
Data analysis
In our analysis we included autochthonous confirmed 
cases of WNND, West Nile fever and infections detected 
in blood and in organ donors; we also analysed data 
on vectors and birds. Annual incidence rates in human 
in the period from 2008 to 2015 were calculated using 
annual resident province population. All population 
data were obtained from the Italian National Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT) [8]. The statistical analysis was 
carried out using STATA software version 11.2 (Stata 
Corporation, College Station, TX, US). Maps were pro-
duced using Epi Info version 7 (CDC, Atlanta, GA, US).
Figure 3
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WNND: West Nile neuroinvasive diseases.
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Results
In Italy from 2008 to 2015, the circulation of WNV was 
reported in mosquitoes, birds and horses in the terri-
tory of 14 regions, with 173 indigenous cases of human 
WNND notified in eight regions (Apulia, Basilicata, 
Emilia-Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lombardy, 
Piedmont, Sardinia, Veneto). Figure 1 shows the geo-
graphical distribution of human and equine neuroinva-
sive cases detected in Italy from 2008 to 2015.
Results of the veterinary surveillance from 2008 to 2015 
are reported in Table 1. Since 2008, more than 16,000 
mosquito pools have been tested, with 435 positive 
results, in eight regions and 30 provinces where sub-
sequently human WNND cases were reported. Positive 
mosquito pools without consecutive or previous detec-
tion of WNND in humans were detected in 2008 in the 
province of Brescia, Lombardy region (n=1); in 2011 in 
the province of Messina, Sicily region (n=1) and in 2014 
in the province of Genoa province, Liguria region and in 
the province of Alessandria province, Piedmont region 
(n=2, respectively). 
In the provinces where there were also human cases, 
viral circulation in mosquitoes preceded human WNV 
(WNND and West Nile fever) cases with a mean of 22 
days (range 0–58), except for few provinces (2011: n=1, 
2012: n=2, 2013 and 2015: n=3, respectively) where 
the identification of human cases anticipated the evi-
dence of viral circulation in vectors (Figure 2).
Also from 2008 to 2015, more than 24,000 residential 
birds were examined, with 296 positive results. WNV 
was found in birds in six regions. In the 15 provinces 
where there were human cases, positive birds were 
identified with a mean of 35 days (range 1–315 days) 
before the appearance of human cases.
During 2008 to 2010, all isolated viruses belonged to 
WNV-lineage 1, from 2011 to 2012 lineage 1 and 2 co-
circulated with a higher proportion of lineage 1 and 
from 2013 to 2015 lineage 2 prevailed over lineage 1 
with evidence of lineage 1 circulation only in one prov-
ince each season.
Human cases
The national incidence of WNND peaked in 
2013 (1.66/1,000,0000 inhabitants) and 2015 
(1.34/1,000,0000). From 2008 to 2011, the annual inci-
dence was relatively low (median: 0.41/1,000,000; 
range: 0.11–0.64). From 2012 to 2015, the national 
incidence of WNND increased by threefold (median: 
1.20/1,000,0000; range: 0.78–1.66). The increase in 
disease incidence was initially concentrated in north-
ern Italy moving over time towards the south, mainly 
to areas in central and to some areas in southern Italy. 
However, 91% (157/173) of the WNND cases detected 
during the entire study period were reported from three 
regions (Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy and Veneto) in the 
Po river plain area (Table 2) with the Emilia-Romagna 
and Veneto regions reporting the highest incidence 
(1.60 and 1.46/1,000,000 respectively).
The distribution of human WNND cases by month and 
year of symptom onset is reported in Figure 3.
The median age of cases was 73 years (range: 10–90 
years) during the entire surveillance period, varying 
from a minimum of 67 years (range: 41–68 years) in 
2010 to 77 years (range: 42–89 years) in 2013. Most of 
the reported cases (69%, 120/173) were male. All WNND 
cases were hospitalised: 82 presented as encephalitis, 
44 as meningo-encephalitis, 31 as meningitis, seven as 
polyradiculoneuritis, one as facial paralysis and eight 
as other neurological symptoms: meningeal symptoms 
(n=2), extrapyramidal syndrome (n=1), confusion (n=1), 
headache (n=1), ataxic paraparesis (n=1), neuropathy 
of lower limbs (n=1), symptoms were not specified for 
one case. Eighteen of the 173 WNND cases died (2009: 
n=3; 2011: n=5; 2012: n=1; 2013: n=7; 2014 and 2015: 
n=1 each), corresponding to an overall case fatality rate 
of 10%. The median age of WNND fatal cases was 82 
years (range: 34–89 years), 14 of 18 were male. All fatal 
cases were reported to have chronic conditions before 
symptom onset and 10 presented with encephalitis, six 
with meningo-encephalitis and two with meningitis.
In the entire period, 69 confirmed cases of WNV fever 
were reported to the national surveillance system from 
Table 1
Veterinary surveillance for West Nile virus in birds, mosquitoes, horses and chickens, Italy by year, 2008–2015
Years
Mosquitoes pool Birds Horses Chickens
Tested Positive Tested Positive Tested Positive Tested Positive
2008 152 8 490 45 1,532 563 76 1
2009 217 20 3,753 22 4,430 223 2,517 0
2010 1,068 13 4,182 3 2,728 128 1,213 5
2011 2,113 8 3,026 11 3,424 197 2,505 34
2012 2,366 14 2,260 21 2,081 63 2,461 6
2013 2,324 146 3,761 79 2,735 50 2,363 0
2014 5,834 125 5,368 48 5,882 27 1,974 7
2015 2,300 101 2,147 67 1,313 30 24 1
Total 16,374 435 24,987 296 24,125 1,281 13,133 54
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four Italian regions (Emilia-Romagna n=31, Lombardy 
n=3, Marche n=1, and Veneto n=34).
Situation in 2015
In Italy in 2015, since the beginning of the surveillance 
period, for the first time since 2008, four cases, two 
from Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy region, respec-
tively, all had symptom onset in the last week of July 
(calendar week 31). The last human cases reported had 
onset of symptoms or were detected in mid-September 
and the integrated surveillance detected signals of 
WNV circulation (veterinary cases), for the first time 
ever, in a northern-western region (Piedmont), where 
also one WNND case was reported. Moreover, virus cir-
culation was detected in animals for the first time in 
the southern Italian regions Apulia (1 horse) and Sicily 
(1 chicken), where no human cases were reported. 
In 2015, a total of 316,614 WNV NAT screening tests 
were conducted in blood donors in the affected prov-
inces and 13 asymptomatic donors, six in Emilia 
Romagna and seven in Lombardy were identified. No 
donor or organ transplant recipients were positive for 
WNV among the 168 tested.
Discussion and conclusions
In Italy from 2008 to 2015, the circulation of WNV 
was reported in mosquitoes, birds and horses in the 
territory of 14 regions [10], with 173 auchtotonous 
cases of human WNND notified. [11]. A peak of cases 
was reported in 2013, a second peak was observed in 
2015. From 2008 to 2015, the Italian contribution to the 
European case load increased substantially i.e. from 
a minimum of 11% (14/128) in 2011 to a maximum of 
56% (60/108) in 2015 [3,9]. Moreover, in this period, an 
expansion of the Italian affected areas from the north-
east to the north-west and south was observed.
From 2008 to 2010, only circulation of lineage 1 was 
reported. The complexity of the epidemiological sce-
nario increased in 2011 with the detection of the novel 
lineage 2 which overcame lineage 1 from 2013 to 2015 
and was responsible for both human and animal cases 
[12]. It is not clear why there was more WNV activity 
Table 2
Incidence of human West Nile neuroinvasive disease cases per 1,000,000 inhabitants by province and year, Italy 2008–2015 
(n=173)
Region Province
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
N. Incidence N. Incidence N. Incidence N. Incidence N. Incidence N. Incidence N. Incidence N. Incidence 
Piedmont Torino 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 0.44
Lombardy
Brescia 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 2 1.60 1 0.79 0 NA
Cremona 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 2.76 3 8.28 4 11.06
Lodi 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 4.43 2 8.73 3 13.07
Mantova 0 NA 2 4.88 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 6 14.59 2 4.82 3 7.23
Milano 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 4 1.25
Pavia 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 5 9.12 5 9.11
Veneto
Belluno 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 4.68 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
Padova 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 1.08 0 NA 0 NA
Rovigo 3 12.18 5 20.23 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 5 20.61 0 NA 1 4.12
Treviso 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 6 6.75 6 6.85 4 4.54 0 NA 0 NA
Venezia 1 1.18 1 1.17 2 2.33 1 1.16 15 17.72 2 2.36 0 NA 0 NA
Verona 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 1.10 1 1.08 0 NA




Gorizia 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 7.15 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
Pordenone 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 2 6.44 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
Udine 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 2 3.69 1 1.87 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
Emilia-
Romagna
Bologna 1 1.04 2 2.05 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 1.01 1 1.00 2 1.99
Ferrara 2 5.62 5 13.97 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 5 14.18 0 NA 1 2.82
Modena 0 NA 2 2.91 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 7 10.17 2 2.85 8 11.39
Parma 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 2.32 1 2.26 3 6.74
Piacenza 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 2 6.93 1 3.47
Reggio 
nell‘Emilia 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 6 11.48 1 1.87 1 1.88
Rimini 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 2.98
Apulia Foggia 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 1.59 0 NA 0 NA
Basilicata Matera 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 5.00 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
Sardinia
Oristano 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 3 18.05 2 12.22 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
Sassari 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 1 2.97 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA
NA: not applicable.
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in the past 4 years of surveillance (2012–2015) com-
pared to the earlier surveillance period (2008–2011). 
However, virus lineage and virulence, weather condi-
tions, bird population size and immunity, vector den-
sity, and human behaviour, are all factors that play 
a role in determining if, when and where human out-
breaks may occur.
In Europe, since 2008, WNV has spread into areas not 
previously affected, including Greece [25], Portugal 
[26], Turkey [27], and many eastern European coun-
tries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, 
Montenegro, Serbia) [28-30]. In the same period the 
disease has been reported in Hungary, Israel, Italy, 
Romania, Russia, Spain and Ukraine [2,29]. 
The fact that the WNV has become endemic in Italy 
has brought the local and national Italian authorities 
to strengthen the WNV surveillance system and for this 
reason, probably, Italy is the country with the highest 
number of reported cases in EU, while other EU coun-
tries have different epidemiological situations, with 
different surveillance systems and objectives [31].
Surveillance of WNV circulation requires an interdis-
ciplinary approach given the complexity of the viral 
biological cycle. For this reason, the integration of 
entomological, veterinary and human surveillance 
systems is an essential tool for public health. In fact, 
the veterinary and entomological surveillance activi-
ties are crucial for estimating the public health risk 
associated with WNV, and for the effective and timely 
control of the disease in humans. In Italy, a serious 
effort has been made to strengthen the integration of 
human with veterinary and entomological surveillance, 
reaching tangible results in the prevention of the dis-
ease [3,7]. In addition, since 2014, some Italian regions 
have explored the feasibility of using vector and ani-
mal surveillance data to trigger blood and organ donor 
safety measures. Encouraging results were obtained in 
2014, during a season with high level of transmission. 
In 2015 however, veterinary surveillance did not signal 
WNV circulation before the occurrence of human cases 
in all affected provinces. Still, when province borders 
are not taken strictly into account and the surround-
ing territories are considered, the entomological and 
veterinary surveillance was able to detect the virus 
circulation also in 2015. Veterinary surveillance identi-
fied WNV circulation in some regions (Apulia, Sardinia, 
Sicily) without any human cases. This could be related 
both to the under ascertainment or under notification 
of human cases to the surveillance system or to lim-
ited circulation of the virus between bird and mosquito 
populations in rural areas.
In conclusion, an integrated human, animal and vector 
surveillance is crucial to timely set up preventive meas-
ures, such as the early detection of infected blood 
donors.
The integration of surveillance activities and the multi-
disciplinary approach in Italy might be a good practice 
to be implemented also in other affected countries for 
the identification of viral circulation. They have been 
fundamental to implement and/or strengthen preven-
tive measures aimed at reducing the risk of transmis-
sion of the WNV to humans.
The work that Italy has being doing in the past 8 years 
of surveillance is constantly enriched by an intense 
research activity and also by the development of inno-
vative tools for the quantification of health risk in 
order to implement prevention measures and effective 
control.
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From January 2014 to December 2014, 972 con-
secutive non-replicate carbapenemase-produc-
ing Enterobacteriaceae isolates from colonised or 
infected patients were collected at the Associated 
French National Reference Centre as part of the 
French national survey on antimicrobial resistance. It 
included 577 Klebsiella spp. (59%), 236 Escherichia 
coli (24%), 108 Enterobacter spp. (11%), 50 Citrobacter 
spp. (5%), and a single Salmonella spp. isolate (0.1%). 
Of 561 K. pneumoniae isolates, 35 were found to be 
resistant to colistin (6.2%). PFGE analysis revealed a 
clonal outbreak involving 15 K. pneumoniae isolates 
belonging to sequence type ST11, recovered in a sin-
gle hospital in the Picardie region in northern France. 
Those clonally related isolates showed variable levels 
of resistance to colistin, ranging from 4 to 64 mg/L. 
They harboured the blaOXA-48 carbapenemase gene 
and the blaCTX-M-15 extended-spectrum beta-lactamase 
gene. Among the 91 Enterobacter cloacae isolates, 
seven were resistant to colistin and produced different 
types of carbapenemases. Surprisingly, none of the E. 
coli and Citrobacter spp. isolates showed resistance 
to colistin. This national survey including carbapene-
mase-producing isolates recovered in 2014 reported a 
high rate of colistin resistance in K. pneumoniae and 
E. cloacae (6.2% and 7.7%, respectively) in France.
Introduction
Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) 
resistant to colistin are increasingly reported. They 
represent an additional link in the development of 
pan-drug resistance. However, the epidemiology of 
colistin resistance among enterobacterial isolates is 
currently almost unknown in most parts of the world. 
In Italy, an increase in carbapenemase-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae has been noted in the past years, 
but the situation remains unknown in France [1]. The 
lack of information about the prevalence of colistin 
resistance among multidrug-resistant enterobacterial 
isolates derives from several reasons: (i) so far, there 
has been limited interest in that field, (ii) methods 
used for determination of colistin susceptibility are not 
adequate, and (iii) the lack of well-defined breakpoints 
does not allow precise determination of prevalence. 
However, the recent identification of a plasmid-borne 
polymyxin resistance determinant (MCR-1) raised a 
very serious concern in that resistance to colistin might 
widely disseminate [2].
The aim of this study was to evaluate retrospectively 
the prevalence of colistin resistance among a collec-
tion of CPE strains recovered in France during a period 
of one year and to analyse the phenotypic, genotypic 




From January to December 2014, 972 consecutive 
non-duplicate isolates of carbapenemase-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae were isolated in private laborato-
ries and hospitals in France either by screening for colo-
nisation or by analysing clinical samples in the context 
of infections. They were recovered from rectal swabs 
or stools (n = 625), urine samples (n = 250), respiratory 
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tract samples (n = 35), blood samples (n = 22), wounds 
(n = 24), catheter (n = 7), vaginal swabs (n = 3) and other 
specimens (n = 6). Those isolates were sent to the 
Associated French National Reference Centre for char-
acterisation of resistance mechanisms to carbapenems 
as part of the French antibiotic resistance survey. The 
972 carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae iso-
lates included 577 isolates of Klebsiella spp. (59%), 
236 isolates of Escherichia coli (24%), 108 isolates 
of Enterobacter spp. (11%), 50 isolates of Citrobacter 
spp. (5%), and a single isolate of Salmonella spp. 
(0.1%). Species that are naturally resistant to colistin 
(Proteus spp., Morganella morganii, Providencia spp., 
and Serratia spp.) had been excluded before the initia-
tion of this study. Only a single isolate per patient was 
included in the study. All isolates were identified using 
the Microflex bench-top MALDI-TOF mass spectrometer 
(Bruker, Champs-sur-Marne, France).
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing
Minimum inhibitory concentrations (MIC) of colistin 
(CS) were determined using broth microdilution method 
according to the guidelines of the Clinical Laboratory 
Standards Institute (CLSI) [3]. As recommended, E. coli 
ATCC 25922 was used as quality control strain.
For the colistin-resistant isolates, susceptibil-
ity to other classes of antibiotics was also tested. 
Susceptibility to imipenem, ertapenem, and tigecycline 
was tested by broth microdilution method according to 
CLSI guidelines, whereas susceptibility to the other 
antibiotics was tested by the standardised agar disk 
diffusion method according to the guidelines of the 
European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility 
Testing (EUCAST) [4]. The antibiotics tested using disk 
diffusion method were: amoxicillin (AMX), amoxicil-
lin/clavulanic acid (AMC), cefotaxime (CTX), cefoxitin 
(FOX), ceftazidime (CAZ), cefepime (FEP), temocillin 
(TEM), ciprofloxacin (CIP), gentamicin (GM), amikacin 
Figure 1





















Easb: Enterobacter asburiae; Ecl: Enterobacter cloacae; Kpn: Klebsiella pneumoniae.
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(AK), trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole (SXT) and fosfo-
mycin (FOS).
The MIC results for colistin and the disk diffusion 
diameters were interpreted according to suscepti-
bility breakpoints of the European Committee on 
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) [4].
Molecular characterisation
The mgrB genes of K. pneumoniae and Enterobacter 
spp. isolates were amplified using specific primers 
(Table 1), knowing that the MgrB protein is a nega-
tive regulator of the PhoPQ two-component system 
and that alterations in the mgrB gene are commonly 
involved in acquisition of colistin resistance in K. 
pneumoniae [5-7]. The plasmid-mediated mcr-1 gene 
encoding colistin resistance was sought as described 
previously [2]. Detection of extended-spectrum beta-
lactamases (ESBL) and carbapenemases genes was 
performed with specific primers as described previ-
ously [8]. Both strands of the amplification products 
obtained were sequenced with an ABI 3100 sequencer 
(Applied Biosystems, Foster City, US). The nucleotide 
and deduced protein sequences were analysed at the 
National Centre for Biotechnology Information website 
(www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) by the Basic Local Alignment 
Search Tool (BLAST) programme.
Genotyping
Genotyping was performed to evaluate the clonal rela-
tionship of the colistin-resistant K. pneumoniae and 
E. cloacae isolates by pulsed-field gel elctrophoresis 
(PFGE) with XbaI-digested genomic DNA and interpreted 
according to Tenover criteria [9]. Multilocus sequence 
typing (MLST) for K. pneumoniae was performed using 





Of 561 K. pneumoniae isolates, 35 were found to be 
resistant to colistin (6%). Fifteen of the 35 colistin-
resistant K. pneumoniae isolates were recovered from 
a single hospital in the Picardie region, northern France 
(Figure 1). We could not obtain the exact dates of their 
isolations due to the retrospective nature of the study. 
These isolates had mostly been recovered from rectal 
swab specimens, but also from a catheter, a urinary 
sample, a wound exudate and a respiratory specimen 
(isolates 1 to 15, Table 2). PFGE analysis revealed that 
the 15 isolates were clonally related (Figure 2, Table 2). 
The clone was of the ST11 type, and was susceptible 
only to cefoxitin, amikacin and fosfomycin (Table 2). A 
single isolate among these 15 was susceptible to tige-
cycline. The 15 isolates harboured both the blaOXA-48 
carbapenemase gene, and the blaCTX-M-15 extended-
spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) gene, and the MICs 
for colistin ranged from 4 to 64 mg/L (Table 2).
The other 20 colistin-resistant K. pneumoniae strains 
were mostly recovered from the regions Ile-de-France 
(n = 6) and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (n = 10) (Figure 
1). These strains presented high MIC values for colistin 
ranging from 16 to >128 mg/L (isolates 16 to 35, Table 
2). They produced either the carbapenemases OXA-48 
(15/20), KPC-2 (3/20), NDM-1 (1/20), or both OXA-48 
and NDM-1 together (1/20) (Table 2). Overall, 14 of the 
20 isolates produced the ESBL CTX-M-15. PFGE analy-
sis identified 18 clonal patterns among the 20 iso-
lates (n = 3 for clone M) (Figure 2, Table 2), and MLST 
assigned the isolates to eight sequence types (STs) 
(Table 2).
Sequencing of the mgrB gene of those K. pneumoniae 
isolates revealed various mgrB alterations and none 
Figure 2
PFGE patterns of XbaI-digested chromosomal DNA of colistin-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates, France, January–
December 2014 (n = 35)
B FE G H I J K M N O
16 18 21 22 23 27 28 2920 24 30 3126 3217 2519 33 34 35
A
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 151
L PC Q R SD
The numbers correspond to the isolates from Table 2 and the letters indicate the PFGE type.
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of the strains harboured the plasmid-encoded mcr-1 
gene.
Antimicrobial susceptibility data for the colistin-resist-
ant K. pneumoniae isolates not involved in the outbreak 
revealed that most isolates (19/20) were non-suscep-
tible to third- and fourth-generation cephalosporins 
(Figure 3A). They were also frequently resistant to 
ciprofloxacin (19/20), trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole 
(15/20) and tigecycline (14/20). They were less often 
resistant to gentamicin and cefoxitin (13/20 and 11/20, 
respectively). Amikacin and fosfomycin remained the 
most active agents against colistin-resistant K. pneu-
moniae (16/20 and 15/20 were susceptible, respec-
tively) (Figure 3A).
Enterobacter spp.
Among the 91 Enterobacter cloacae isolates, seven 
were resistant to colistin (7.7%). They showed high MIC 
values for colistin (ranging from 16 to >128 mg/L) (iso-
lates 36 to 42, Table 2). They produced the carbapen-
emases OXA-48 (4/7), VIM-1 (1/7), IMP-1 (1/7), or both 
OXA-48 and VIM-1 together (1/7) (Table 2). In total, 
three of seven strains were CTX-M producers, with two 
isolates producing CTX-M-15 and a single isolate pro-
ducing CTX-M-2. The colistin-resistant E. cloacae iso-
lates were recovered in different geographical regions 
in France (Figure 1, Table 2), and results of the PFGE 
analysis revealed that they were not clonally related 
(data not shown).
The single carbapenem-resistant E. asburiae strain 
was resistant to colistin. It had an MIC of colistin above 
128 mg/L and produced the VIM-1 carbapenemase (iso-
late 43, Table 2).
Figure 3
Antimicrobial non-susceptibilities among colistin-resistant isolates, France, January–December 2014
AMX              AMC             CTX               FOX               CAZ              FEP                IMI               ERT               TEM               CIP               SXT               TIG                GM               AK                FOS


































































A. Klebsiella pneumoniae (except the strains responsible for the outbreak in Picardie) (n=35)
B. Enterobacter spp. (n=8)
AK: amikacin; AMC: amoxicillin/clavulanic acid; AMX: amoxicillin; CAZ: ceftazidime; CIP: ciprofloxacin; CTX: cefotaxime; ERT: ertapenem; 
FEP: cefepime; FOS: fosfomycin; FOX: cefoxitin; GM: gentamicin; IMI: imipenem; SXT: trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole; TEM: temocillin; TIG: 
tigecycline.
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All Enterobacter spp. isolates had a wild-type mgrB 
gene, leaving unexplained the colistin resistance 
mechanism (E. cloacae and E. asburiae) (Table 2).
Of the eight colistin-resistant Enterobacter spp. iso-
lates, four were non-susceptible to cefepime and 
tigecycline, and three were non-susceptible to cip-
rofloxacin, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole and gen-
tamicin (Figure 3B). Amikacin and fosfomycin were the 
most active agents against colistin-resistant E. cloacae 
(all seven isolates were susceptible) (Figure 3B).
Other species
None of the E. coli (n = 236) and Citrobacter spp. (n = 50) 
isolates were resistant to colistin.
Discussion
We describe here a clonal outbreak involving 15 K. 
pneumoniae isolates recovered from a single hospital 
in the Picardie region in northern France. This outbreak 
was caused by a colistin-resistant OXA-48 and CTX-
M-15-producing K. pneumoniae of ST11 type that was 
susceptible only to cefoxitin, amikacin and fosfomycin. 
Surprisingly, those clonally related isolates had vari-
able MIC values for colistin ranging from 4 to 64 mg/L. 
An ST11 clone co-producing OXA-48 and CTX-M-15 was 
responsible for a large outbreak involving 44 patients 
in a hospital in Madrid, Spain, from 2009 to 2014 but 
only 3.4% of the isolates were resistant to colistin [11].
Several outbreaks of colistin-resistant KPC-producing 
K. pneumoniae (mainly attributed to the international 
epidemic clone type ST258) have been reported across 
Europe, in Greece [12,13], Hungary [14], Italy [15-17] 
and the Netherlands [18]. A single outbreak of colis-
tin-resistant VIM-1-producing K. pneumoniae has also 
been described in Spain [19]. 
We report also 20 colistin-resistant K. pneumoniae 
strains recovered from the regions Ile-de-France and 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur. These strains belonged 
to 10 sequence types (n = 2 ST147, n = 3 ST258, n = 6 
ST101, n = 3 ST307) and PFGE analysis identified 18 pat-
terns among the 20 isolates. All three KPC-producing 
K. pneumoniae isolates belonged to ST258, the most 
common clone for KPC-producing isolates [20]. The 
OXA-48-producing K. pneumoniae isolates belonged to 
nine sequence types with six strains that were ST101, 
the most common clone identified among OXA-48-
positive K. pneumoniae [21].
Sequencing of the mgrB gene revealed mgrB altera-
tions which are likely to be responsible for colistin 
resistance as described previously [5-7]. Interestingly, 
the three strains belonging to the single clone M recov-
ered in the Provence-Alpes Côtes-d’Azur region had 
different mechanisms of mgrB inactivation (Table 2). 
The occurrence of such different mechanisms of colis-
tin resistance among clonally related isolates indicates 
that it is not the product of clonal dissemination of a 
single colistin-resistant K. pneumoniae strain, but 
rather clonal dissemination of a carbapenemase-pro-
ducing isolate, which has acquired colistin resistance 
thereafter.
The rates of colistin resistance among the carbapen-
emase-producing isolates were 7.7% for Enterobacter 
spp. and 3.6% for K. pneumoniae isolates (exclud-
ing the isolates responsible for the outbreak in the 
Picardie region). The resistance rate observed among 
the carbapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae isolates 
was much lower than the high rates reported in the 
neighbouring countries of southern Europe such as 
Spain (20%) [19] and Italy (43%) [1].
None of the 236 carbapenemase-producing E. coli iso-
lates were colistin-resistant or carried the mcr-1 gene. 
This is surprising considering that a recent report of the 
French antimicrobial resistance Resapath surveillance 
network identified the plasmid-borne mcr-1 gene in 
21% of ESBL-producing E. coli isolates recovered from 
faeces of veal calves in France between 2005 and mid-
2014 [22]. The plasmid-borne mcr-1 colistin resistance 
gene has also been found in many neighbouring coun-
tries of France, for example among ESBL-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae isolates recovered from river water 
and imported vegetable samples in Switzerland [23], 
in E. coli isolates recovered from calves and piglets in 
Belgium [24], in swine and human wound infections 
in Germany [25], and in food and human bloodstream 
infections in Denmark [26]. The mcr-1 gene was also 
detected in Salmonella enterica from food samples 
in Portugal [27] and France [28]. An E. coli isolate co-
harbouring the blaVIM-1 carbapenemase gene and the 
mcr-1 gene was described in Switzerland [29] and an 
isolate co-producing NDM-9 and MCR-1 was reported 
from China [30]. We believe that the plasmid carry-
ing the mcr-1 gene might be currently more prevalent 
among ESBL-producing isolates than among carbap-
enemase-producing isolates in human samples, which 
would explain why we did not identify this gene in our 
collection of carbapenemase-producing isolates.
Amikacin and fosfomycin were most effective against 
the colistin and carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae 
(susceptibility rates of 80% and 75%, respectively) and 
Table 1
Oligonucleotides used as primers in this study, France, 
January–December 2014 
Oligonucleotides Sequence (5’-3’) Reference
Kpn mgrB ext F TTA AGA AGG CCG TGC TAT CC [7]
Kpn mgrB ext R AAG GCG TTC ATT CTA CCA CC [7]
Kpn mgrB int F CGG TGG GTT TTA CTG ATA GTC This study
Kpn mgrB int R GAA CAT CCT GGT CGC ACA TT This study
Ent mgrB ext F CGG TTT ACT CTA TGA AAC AAG TGC This study
Ent mgrB ext R GCG AAG GAA GGA AAT CAC CT This study
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Table 2a
Characteristics of the colistin-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae and Enterobacter spp. clinical isolates, France, January–
December 2014 (n = 43) 
Isolate Site of isolation Origin
MIC 





1 ? Picardie 32 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT 11 A
2 Catheter Picardie 8 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
3 Rectal swab Picardie 4 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
4 Rectal swab Picardie 4 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
5 Rectal swab Picardie 64 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
6 Urine Picardie 32 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
7 Rectal swab Picardie 64 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
8 Wound Picardie 4 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
9 Respiratory Picardie 4 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
10 Rectal swab Picardie 4 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
11 Rectal swab Picardie 8 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
12 Rectal swab Picardie 64 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
13 Rectal swab Picardie 8 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
14 Rectal swab Picardie 4 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
15 Rectal swab Picardie 4 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 11 A
16 Rectal swab Nord-Pas-de-Calais 128
IS1R in promoter region 
(between nt −45 and −46) OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 147 B
17 Rectal swab Ile-de-France 128 mgrB WT NDM CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 147 C
18 Rectal swab PACA >128 ISKpn26-like in coding region (between nt +74 and +75) KPC - CIP AK SXT TIG 258 D
19 Rectal swab Rhône-Alpes 128 MgrB truncated (27 amino acids) KPC - CIP AK SXT TIG 258 E
20 Blood PACA 16 Full gene deletionc KPC - CIP AK SXT TIG 258 F
21 Rectal swab Lorraine 64 Single nucleotide deletion (nt 74) OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM 101 G
22 Rectal swab Ile-de-France 32 Single nucleotide deletion (nt 23) OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM 101 H
23 Rectal swab Ile-de-France 64 IS1R in promoter region (between nt −36 and −37) OXA-48 + NDM CTX-M-15 CIP GM 101 I
24 Urine PACA 64 IS1R in promoter region (between nt −45 and −46) OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 101 J
25 Abcess Ile-de-France 32 MgrB M27K OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM 101 K
26 Urine Pays de la Loire 128 Duplication of 19 nucleotides OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP SXT FOS 101 L
27 Urine PACA 64 IS1R in coding region (between nt +21 and +22) OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 307 M
28 Rectal swab PACA 64 mgrB WT OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG FOS 307 M
29 Rectal swab PACA 64 IS5-like in coding region (between nt +74 and +75) OXA-48 CTX-M-15 CIP GM SXT TIG 307 M
30 Urine PACA >128 Full gene deletionb OXA-48 - CIP GM AK SXT TIG FOS 611 N
31 Rectal swab Ile-de-France 32 ISKpn14-like in promoter region (between nt −45 and −46) OXA-48 - CIP GM SXT TIG 23 O
Isolates 1-35: Klebsiella pneumoniae; 36–42: Enterobacter cloacae; 43: Enterobacter asburiae.
AK: amikacin; CIP: ciprofloxacin; CS: colistin; FOS: fosfomycin; GM: gentamicin; MIC: minimum inhibitory concentration; NA: not applicable; 
nt: nucleotide; PACA: Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur; PFGE: pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; ST: sequence type; SXT: trimethoprim-
sulfamethoxazole; TIG: tigecycline; WT: wildtype.
a MIC of colistin determined by broth microdilution method.
b Resistant or intermediate susceptibility to antibiotic.
c Full gene deletion: no PCR product was detected with external or internal primers.
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E. cloacae isolates (susceptibility rates of 87%). The 
rate of tigecycline non-susceptibility was high (70% for 
K. pneumoniae and 50% for Enterobacter spp.), prob-
ably because of a strong selective pressure by this 
last-line antibiotic.
Conclusion
This national survey on carbapenemase-producing iso-
lates recovered in 2014 discovered a high rate of colis-
tin resistance in K. pneumoniae and E. cloacae (6.2% 
and 7.7%, respectively) in France. These resistance 
rates remain much lower than those observed in other 
European countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain. 
No plasmid-encoded mcr-1 gene was identified here. 
Therefore it seems that it is still possible to control the 
spread of those multidrug-resistant isolates based on 
accurate identification of colistin resistance and isola-
tion of plasmid-encoded MCR-1 producers. Amikacin 
and fosfomycin remained the antibiotic agents most 
effective against those isolates which were resistant to 
polymyxins and produced a carbapenemase.
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This report outlines the evidence and main conclusions 
presented at an expert workshop on Cryptosporidium 
genotyping held on 16 and 17 June 2016, hosted by the 
Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, and funded by EU COST 
Action FA1408 “A European Network for Foodborne 
Parasites: Euro-FBP” (http://www.euro-fbp.org).
The consultation brought together 23 scientists and 
experts in public and animal health from 12 European 
countries and the United States (US) to discuss how 
Cryptosporidium spp. surveillance and outbreak inves-
tigations could benefit from a harmonised approach 
to intra-species differentiation of the two main human 
pathogens, C. parvum and C. hominis. These are major 
zoonotic and anthroponotic causes of gastroenteritis, 
respectively. There is currently no standardised geno-
typing scheme for these protozoan parasites.
The workshop was organised in two parts: firstly, spe-
cialists described the current state of knowledge and 
need, and secondly, four working groups considered 
different aspects of the development, implementa-
tion and maintenance of Cryptosporidium genotyping 
schemes.
An overview of genotyping 
Cryptosporidium for public health purposes
Laetitia Kortbeek (National Institute for Public Health 
and the Environment, the Netherlands) described the 
diagnosis of Cryptosporidium and the usefulness of 
genotyping for epidemiology. Although cryptosporidi-
osis cases are notifiable in some European Union (EU) 
countries, testing and diagnostic practices are variable. 
Improved understanding of the epidemiology, sources 
and transmission of cryptosporidiosis is needed, but 
surveillance is also highly variable and the quality of 
the data provided to the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) hinders comparisons 
between countries [1]. Improved diagnosis and basic 
surveillance across the EU would provide the means to 
estimate and compare the prevalence of cryptosporidi-
osis and detect changing trends in transmission.
The complexity of Cryptosporidium transmission was 
highlighted using data from the Netherlands, where 
a proportion of Cryptosporidium-positive stools are 
genotyped to identify species. In the second half of 
2012, an excess of cases, mainly due to C. hominis, 
triggered an alert to other EU countries via ECDC’s 
Epidemic Intelligence Information System for Food and 
Waterborne Diseases (EPIS); the United Kingdom (UK) 
and Germany also reported an increase [2]. An ongoing 
case–control study in the Netherlands failed to reveal 
an endemic source. In the following year, C. parvum 
predominated and risk factors for infection included 
the use of inland bathing waters and animal contact 
(not unexpected for C. parvum). More discriminatory 
genotyping of isolates could contribute to the identifi-
cation of parasite sources and routes of transmission. 
As a first step, partial sequencing of a gene encoding a 
highly variable surface antigen (gp60) has shown that 
C. hominis allele IbA10G2 is highly prevalent through-
out Europe, whereas C. parvum has greater diversity at 
this locus [3]. There is no specific licensed treatment in 
the EU for cryptosporidiosis, so understanding the epi-
demiology and improving the ability to identify sources 
through genotyping are important for the interrup-
tion of transmission routes and subsequent disease 
reduction.
The confusing world of Cryptosporidium 
typing
Giovanni Widmer (Tufts University, US) described how 
consideration of the reproductive biology and genetics 
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of the parasite and analysis of metadata from stud-
ies that used the same genotyping markers have pro-
vided further clarification of Cryptosporidium diversity, 
especially within C. parvum. The lifecycle involves 
asexual and sexual reproductive stages, requiring a 
multilocus scheme to account for sexual recombina-
tion within genetically diverse populations. Therefore, 
it is important to select markers that are sufficiently 
distant or located on different chromosomes, to ensure 
they are not in linkage. Excluding markers that provide 
redundant information reduces wastage and increases 
efficiency. As part of the marker selection process, 
ordination methods such as principal coordinates anal-
ysis and rank abundance plots can be used to estimate 
objectively how informative individual genetic markers 
and their combinations are. Because of the multivari-
ate nature of multilocus data, ordination methods are 
ideal to visualise genetic similarity among isolates 
[4] and infer the likely source of an outbreak. In silico 
analysis of existing data can be used to improve and 
harmonise current genotyping approaches for surveil-
lance and outbreak investigations.
Human epidemiology and food-borne 
outbreaks
Rachel Chalmers (National Cryptosporidium Reference 
Unit, UK) showed how supplementing epidemiological 
and environmental data with Cryptosporidium species 
and gp60 allele identification has strengthened the 
statistical evidence of association with food exposures 
in outbreaks. In May 2012, an excess of 300 cases of C. 
parvum was linked to the consumption of pre-cut mixed 
salad leaves, spinach and tomatoes [5]. The odds of 
association with eating pre-cut mixed salad leaves 
were increased when the case definition was restricted 
to those infected with gp60 allele IIaA15G2R1. In 2015, 
C. hominis infections exceeded expected numbers by 
more than 900 cases in late summer/early autumn, trig-
gering an EPIS alert, with a similar increase reported 
by the Netherlands. Hypothesis-generating question-
naires revealed no sufficiently common exposures or 
risk factors to allow a case–control study. Isolates 
with the gp60 allele IbA10G2 predominated. Not only 
is this allele highly prevalent among C. hominis iso-
lates from northern Europe, but there is also limited 
heterogeneity at other loci, highlighting the limita-
tion of multilocus genotyping as an epidemiological 
tool for this species [3]. Suitable samples [6] with the 
IbA10G2 allele were further analysed by whole genome 
sequencing. Very few differences were seen in pairwise 
comparisons, with at most 50 single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNPs) observed in the ca 9.2 Mbp genome; 
the significance of these extremely small differences is 
currently unknown. In contrast, a C. parvum outbreak 
of more than 300 cases at the end of 2015 was defined 
by an unusual gp60 allele, IIdA24G1, recognised ini-
tially by the Scottish Parasite Diagnostic and Reference 
Laboratory, highlighting the value of genotyping rou-
tinely and including the data in national surveillance. 
A case–control study revealed food-linked exposures 
and the outbreak remains under investigation at the 
time of writing, demonstrating the difficulties in food 
chain investigations.
Zoonotic transmission
Karin Troell (National Veterinary Institute, Sweden) 
illustrated the importance of applying One Health 
approaches to the investigation of Cryptosporidium as 
a zoonosis. In Sweden, samples are tested from any 
likely host animal that is linked to a human crypto-
sporidiosis case, for example from household cats 
when C. felis has been detected in a patient [7]. This 
has led to collaborative studies on other, less common, 
species causing human infections. These findings rein-
force the need for clinical diagnostics to detect not 
only C. parvum and C. hominis.
The most common zoonotic species in humans, C. par-
vum, has an unusual epidemiology in cattle in Sweden, 
where some studies have shown low prevalence even 
in young calves. This is in contrast to other countries 
where C. parvum is the main cause of cryptosporidi-
osis in pre-weaned calves [8]. Despite this, one of 
the most common C. parvum gp60 alleles in cattle, 
IIaA16G1R1, is also frequent in humans in Sweden. To 
support epidemiological investigations, a multilocus 
sequencing tool based on nine SNP markers across five 
chromosomes has been evaluated in a multiplex PCR 
on numerous samples; high discriminatory power and 
evidence of transmission between calves and humans 
in Sweden was shown.However, further studies of the 
population structure of C. parvum are needed across 
Europe to assess the broader applicability of this 
scheme.
How diversity relates to transmission to 
humans
Simone Cacciò (National Institute of Health, Italy) 
described the apparent geographic diversity of C. par-
vum in Ireland, Italy, and Scotland, as revealed by mul-
tilocus analyses. Studies so far indicate that in those 
countries, C. parvum populations from humans and 
livestock may have become isolated from each other, 
to the extent that the opportunity for genetic inter-
change appears limited [9]. To investigate the degree 
of genetic isolation, further studies are needed across 
Europe that include the major hosts for C. parvum. 
One study showed that in the UK, a high proportion 
of C. hominis isolates were indistinguishable at mul-
tiple loci, contrasting with those from Uganda, where 
a more diverse population structure was found [10]. 
Therefore, conclusions from one location may not be 
widely applicable and information is specific to host 
populations, whether these are defined geographi-
cally or demographically. A European-wide project 
(COMPARE; http://www.compare-europe.eu/) aims to 
increase the number of whole genome sequences for 
Cryptosporidium and to develop bioinformatic pipe-
lines that would further the understanding of the pop-
ulation biology and determinants of virulence of the 
parasite. Information from COMPARE will undoubtedly 
benefit typing scheme development.
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Four working groups considered how the evidence pre-
sented could be used to develop, implement and main-
tain suitable genotyping resources for Cryptosporidium.
Are the genetic and population structures 
of Cryptosporidium amenable to developing 
a genotyping scheme?
One working group considered whether reliable pre-
dictions of transmission can be made by combining 
genotyping with epidemiological and clinical data, 
considering that genetic diversity and population 
structures differ for C. parvum and C. hominis. It con-
cluded that data are currently unavailable for much of 
Europe and are often not comparable because of lack 
of standardisation, indicating the need for further stud-
ies. Sampling frames need to follow the One Health 
concept, including both human and animal samples. 
Comparative analysis of increasingly available genome 
sequence data can provide a solid basis for marker 
selection. An evaluation process should be defined 
and applied to those markers already used.
What needs to be done to develop a 
standardised, multilocus genotyping 
scheme?
Another working group considered the development of 
separate multilocus schemes for C. parvum and C. homi-
nis to provide robust, cost-effective assays, suitable for 
specialist and reference laboratories. Fragment sizing 
of regions containing tandem nucleotide repeats was 
considered alongside in-house sequencing. The deci-
sion whether to choose fragment sizing or sequencing 
will depend on the best workflow for individual labora-
tories, but markers that provide the same results with 
either method would be desirable. Sequence data from 
gp60 remains important. The most suitable markers 
need to be identified through a structured and objec-
tive process, ideally starting from whole-genome com-
parisons. Well-defined panels of samples are needed 
for biological and statistical evaluation of individual 
markers and their combinations, before progressing to 
inter-laboratory trials. DNA standards should be avail-
able. A web-based database needs be developed to 
contextualise metadata and genetic identification of 
isolates.
A multilocus genotyping scheme as a 
component of epidemic preparedness and 
response
A third working group considered multilocus genotyp-
ing as a component of a resilient response for health 
protection, highlighting that any scheme should be 
informative for epidemiological investigations and 
the detection and management of outbreaks, and 
that genotyping results should be incorporated into 
the collection of high quality epidemiological data. 
Differentiating between what is ‘nice to know’ and 
‘essential to know’ is important: at present, there 
is more to be gained from genotyping C. parvum, as 
a high proportion of C. hominis cases in Europe have 
the gp60 allele IbA10G2, which is associated with low 
diversity at other markers. If genotyping all cases can-
not be justified, selection will depend on outbreak 
size and available information and is probably best 
delivered as a test done in specialist or reference 
laboratories. Simulated outbreak exercises should be 
undertaken.
Sustainability of a standardised, multilocus 
genotyping scheme
The final working group discussed the elements 
needed to sustain a standardised scheme, including 
validation, external quality control (EQA), and inclu-
sion of future developments, for example identification 
of new informative markers. A good mechanism for EQA 
should be established using an independent provider, 
also providing training modules and DNA standards. 
Central, ongoing collection of a minimum set of meta-
data are needed to facilitate surveillance of genotypes 
and meaningful comparisons and interpretation; this 
may be possible through the Cryptosporidium data-
base at http://CryptoDB.org. Nomenclature for mul-
tilocus genotypes needs to be adopted for effective 
interdisciplinary communication.
Conclusions
Increased standardisation of diagnostic practices for 
Cryptosporidium is fundamental to the meaningful 
interpretation of surveillance data and distribution of 
species and genotypes. A robust, standardised, multi-
locus genotyping scheme should be developed, using 
a defined process to replace or supplement the mul-
titude of genotyping methods used. Although further 
genotyping of C. parvum would be highly informative, 
this procedure may not always be warranted for the 
genetically more conserved C. hominis in Europe. A 
web-based database, enabling interpretation of geno-
type occurrence and distribution trends in an epidemi-
ological context, is required. Genotype data should be 
incorporated into national surveillance programmes, 
and a standardised nomenclature provided for effec-
tive communication with public health professionals.
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